

Haiti and the Future of Warfare

E.D. McGrady • Karen Smith


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Summary

Lately, there has been a lot of debate about how military operations are changing. Changes in information technology and the ability to transmit new types of information may be affecting the character of warfare. The end of the Cold War, along with other social and political changes, are also seen as important harbingers of change in the way military forces are used. Some believe that we are either in, or at the beginning of, a revolution in military affairs (RMA).

This study looked at what planning and events surrounding a recent operation, Operation Uphold Democracy, the U.S. led intervention in Haiti, tell us about the question: What do changes in technology and operations mean for the operational level (Joint Task Force) commander?

Operations in Haiti reflect several different aspects of how operational command, and the employment of forces at the operational level of war, is evolving.

- Today's operations require military commanders to play an active role in nonmilitary matters. By nonmilitary, we mean political, diplomatic, social, humanitarian, and other civilian concerns that do not relate directly to warfighting. In Uphold Democracy, Lieutenant General Hugh Shelton, the JTF commander, was involved in ensuring a successful and peaceful transition of power from the Cédras-led military government to President Aristide's new civilian government. Direct involvement in this process required General Shelton to be one of the first soldiers on the ground. He had to immediately begin the process of negotiation and intimidation required to lead the Haitian military government through the transition of power.
- To be successful, the operational commander must understand the *context* of an operation. Context refers to those elements of an operation that rely as much on the commander's judgment

and understanding as his knowledge of the facts. These elements include the mission's definition, the enemy's intentions, the actions of other supporting forces, and the overall political situation. It is not that these are new elements of a military operation. But the unique nature of operations such as Uphold Democracy requires a different approach—one that takes the context into account. Specifically, these operations require:

- *Anticipation* of problems that have not been seen before, even in lessons from similar operations
 - *Information* that is not readily available through traditional military intelligence channels
 - *Synthesis* of widely divergent sets of information and skills
 - *Understanding* of the broader historical, political, and social environment in which the operation is occurring
 - *Creativity*, or the ability to look outside of the current environment to find innovative solutions to problems.
- Improvements in both communications and intelligence collection and synthesis give the operational commander the ability to precisely and simultaneously target and attack those elements of an enemy's government that give it power and legitimacy. In Desert Storm, airpower was used to strike at important elements of Iraqi infrastructure. In Uphold Democracy, had U.S. troops needed to forcibly enter the country, they would have used Special Operations Forces (SOF), airborne paratroopers, and amphibious forces as a precision force, to simultaneously attack the small groups, weapons, and facilities that made up the Haitian government's power base.
 - The nature of political crises such as the one in Haiti makes actual military operations a last resort. Before committing to the use of force, our government tried many different methods to pressure the Cédras military government into leaving. These methods included economic, political, and social pressure, combined with information operations. The *threat* of military force was always present during this period. This threat had to be credible. The implication for military forces is that they may

face a lingering period when they are required to be present and ready, but not active.

- In operations where violence is a last resort, information operations will likely play a key role. Information operations allow the operational commander to persuade, intimidate, confuse, or cajole the opponent into accepting the strategic objectives, ideally without the use of force.

In thinking about the implications of Operation Uphold Democracy for future operations, we found important, specific implications for naval forces.

We have already discussed the importance of a credible and sustainable military presence throughout all the phases of the crisis. Naval forces routinely perform the presence mission and are designed to linger in the vicinity of the objective while measures other than military force are brought to bear.

The Navy also offered the Unified Commander in Chief (CINC) and the Joint Force Commander (JFC) a way to obtain the operational flexibility they needed to conduct the operation. In Uphold Democracy, airpower was not the appropriate tool to accomplish the precise, simultaneous attack planned against the Haitian military government; Special Forces and airborne paratroopers were needed. Navy ships provided staging platforms for Army, Marine Corps, and Special Forces troops. Navy ships also provided platforms for command and control and information operations. When access to land bases is constrained, flexible employment of naval assets can help the JFC meet the demands of operations where using force is a last resort, and the military may be only one of many factors influencing events.

Introduction

In its planning and execution, Operation Uphold Democracy,¹ the U.S.-led intervention in Haiti, combined the elements of both forcible entry and humanitarian operations. It was planned as an airborne assault, but turned into a complicated peacekeeping operation. The plans, command and control, and ultimate execution of the operation all can be used to illustrate how recent changes in technology and the missions assigned to the military may affect military operations.

Some believe that rapid advances in the technologies militaries use, the way they are organized, and the missions they may be asked to perform, may bring about revolutionary changes in military affairs. A revolution in military affairs (RMA)² can be defined as what occurs when new technologies are introduced into a significant number of military systems and combined with innovative operational concepts and conduct of conflict [5].

1. Operations in Haiti had many code words; for example, Restore Democracy was also commonly used. Many different opinions existed as to what the operation should be called: an invasion, intervention, or "intervasion." For consistency, we will refer to all planning for U.S. entry into Haiti after 1993 and operations in the summer and fall of 1994 as Uphold Democracy, and we will call the actual operation an intervention. For other perspectives, see [1-4]. By using the generic term "Uphold Democracy" we do not mean to blur the distinction between Multinational Force (MNF) operations in Haiti (September 1994-March 1995) and the subsequent UN peacekeeping mandates (UN Mission in Haiti) (March 1995-present). These phases of the operation occurred after the time period we discuss in this paper.
2. The term "revolution in military affairs" expands the scope of the revolution to include factors that affect the military in addition to changes in technology and organizations. The term "revolution in political-military affairs" (RPMA) is also used to expand the scope of the RMA. In this paper, we use RMA to refer to change in the social, military, and political aspects of conflict.

In examining operations before and during Uphold Democracy, we will see that changes are occurring that go beyond military technology and organizational concepts. The requirements of operations such as Uphold Democracy have expanded the scope of military operations. Technology, particularly civilian and military commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) communications technology, has both expanded the military's horizons and integrated military and civilian decision-making processes. In this paper, we explore some of the changes we see reflected in the plans and operations that occurred as part of Uphold Democracy and relate these changes to the overall concept of a revolution in military affairs.

Of course, examining one recent operation is not the only way to view the question of how military operations are changing. Others have looked at historical trends or focused on the possibilities in future technology. But our approach can complement historical analysis, and it may even give a unique counter-perspective to the current emphasis on technology, or what can be bought. Instead, the emphasis is on operations and ideas, or what can be done.

In the next section, we will provide some brief background material on Haiti and the RMA. We will then examine Operation Uphold Democracy as it unfolded to develop the basis for our observations about how military operations are changing.

Background

The U.S. intervention in Haiti

Operation Uphold Democracy, the September 1994 intervention by U.S. forces in Haiti, was the latest in a series of interventions by U.S. forces in the Caribbean and Latin America.³ At the time, however, it

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3. This paper is the second part of a two-part series on operation Uphold Democracy. Although it draws on open sources for documentation, many of the points included here are covered in detail in [1], where we have drawn on both the on-scene experience of operations analysts and all-source documentation. Additional details on the issues and historical events described in this paper can also be found in [3 and 6].

was the first major operation since Desert Storm in which the United States planned to use significant military force against another government.

The planned intervention in Haiti can be viewed from many different perspectives. It was a political and humanitarian operation involving U.S. forces. By political, we mean that it was tied to significant U.S. domestic political considerations, as well as international concerns about democracy in Haiti. It was also an orchestrated economic, information, and diplomatic campaign designed to oust the military government of Haiti. And it was planned as a classic *coup de main* using airborne and seaborne troops to depose the Haitian military government.

As it turned out, the actual operation had aspects of all the planned operations described above, but it also differed from each of them. The economic sanctions and information and political campaigns appeared to require the backup of the assault forces before the military government of Haiti actually gave in to U.S. demands that it step down. When it did finally agree to leave, the Carter-Cédras agreement resulted in calling off U.S. assault forces, Haiti retaining the military government for another month, and the U.S. forces entering the country while the military government was still notionally in charge.

Despite some of the complicated, last-minute changes that occurred in Haiti, an examination of what occurred in the months before and after the U.S. intervention allows us to look at some of the factors that may influence future operations.

The revolution in military affairs

Recently, military historians and others have become interested in the concept of accelerated change in organizations and technology, and its effects on both society and the military. This concept was first popularized by Alvin and Heidi Toffler in their books, *Future Shock* and *The Third Wave*. The Tofflers have since continued to develop the thesis that technology is driving accelerated social, and now military, change [7-10].

Military historians have picked up on the concept of accelerated change and adapted it to a historical and military context. They maintain that accelerated change in military technology and operational concepts was responsible for revolutionary changes that occurred during certain periods in history [5, 11–17]. They contend that recent improvements in weapons, communications, and information-processing technologies, combined with new operational concepts, portend or are causing a revolution in military affairs or a military technological revolution (MTR).⁴

Reviewing a range of writings on the RMA, including references [5, 11–17], suggests that most concepts of the RMA include the following:

- The progress of military arms and systems can be divided into distinct historical eras. Although the number and nature of these historical eras differ from author to author, RMA proponents assume that innovations in technology and organization have created periods of dramatic shift in how military forces operate. Examples include the introduction of smoothbore muskets and line tactics in 1648, and German infiltration and *blitzkrieg* tactics in World War II.
- RMAs are not merely technological revolutions. They also encompass changes in organization and concepts [18].
- An RMA results in a radically new way of operating that combines technological change with new ways of thinking about *how* to operate.
- The changes can make a decisive difference in battle, particularly for those who are first to adopt the new technologies, organizations, and concepts.

The concept of a revolution in warfare has many variations.

4. The term “military technological revolution” was first coined by Andy Marshall: “The application of new technologies into military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation to alter fundamentally the character and conduct of military operations.”

The focus of the author can be an important ingredient in determining which part of the revolution is emphasized. A focus on technology has led to concepts such as dominant battlefield awareness, integrated forces, and the Force 21 concepts [17–20]. These concepts center on the ability to collect, process, and disseminate information rapidly and accurately during battle.

Still others have predicted a different future for military forces by focusing on social and political change. Social and political changes include disruptions in Western societies and cultures, as well as conflicts between cultures. The effects of the information revolution and the pressures it puts on culture and organizations; the privatization of functions previously the responsibility of governments; and other social and economic pressures predicted for the future (demographic changes, for example) have led to a variety of potential scenarios for future conflicts.

Examples of other models for future militaries and military operating environments include:


- An increase in paramilitary, personal, and low-intensity conflicts [21]
- The collapse of traditional nation states, including internal unrest within the United States [22–24]
- A withering of the concept of a nation state, and its replacement by other military and economic powers [25–28]
- The rise of cultural and ethnic conflicts, and a predominance of warfare based on culture [29–31].

One of the questions inherent in the RMA is whether change is occurring now, or whether military operations are only on the threshold of great changes. Although we still have significant technological limitations, we are *now* capable of doing much of the information management and precision targeting usually associated with this most recent RMA. One of the key ingredients to understanding the current changes is a connection between what the military *systems* and *organizations* are designed to do, and what *everything* connected with the operation, what we call the *context* of the operation, requires from them.

Context

One way to understand what we mean by context is to look at the various aspects of an operation. Figure 1 illustrates the breakdown of some of the components of a Joint Task Force (JTF) operation. Every operation has some civilian, military, and interagency aspects. For the military commander in a traditional military operation, where warfighting is the main purpose of military involvement, the military context matters most. In other operations, including Uphold Democracy, the military, civilian, and interagency aspects may be more evenly balanced.

Figure 1. Operational context



Even within the military context of the operation, the commander must deal with a range of organizations and viewpoints. Joint operations have been characterized as “overlapping battle space” between the services [32]. Overlapping battle space implies that the physical

areas where the services engage the enemy are overlapping because of increases in the range of weapons and sensors. For example, in some instances, ground fires can engage targets formerly only accessible to aircraft. This change, in turn, has driven the services toward more joint organizations and doctrine.

More than the physical overlap of battle spaces (certainly as far back as Vietnam the services were capable of engaging the enemy at considerable distances), improvements in communications have facilitated and increased the integration of service efforts. Although weapons and sensors may require coordination in the physical battle space, improvements in communications help to integrate the organizations that wield the weapons.

Overlap in the “organizational space” of a conflict may, with ever-increasing communications capabilities, be expanding to include overlap with civilian and interagency bureaucracies and organizations. In many operations, the military overlaps other organizations, many of which are not designed or oriented to work within a military context. This overlap may drive the military commander toward developing organizational elements, as well as operational attitudes, that allow him to work with these other elements of the operation.

In this paper, we explore two aspects of overlapping “operations space”: an emerging capability to use ground forces in ways similar to those called for in airpower theory, and the influence nonmilitary considerations can have on military operations.

Road map

In order to describe the military and civilian contexts of Uphold Democracy, we have chosen to tell our story chronologically. This natural narrative order reveals several different, but related, lessons about the nature of future military operations. We begin with the months and years preceding the intervention itself, looking beyond the military option to the broader context of measures taken by the United States to deal with the situation in Haiti. The United States initially used political, diplomatic, and economic tools to try to persuade the illegitimate military government of Haiti to leave.

When these approaches failed to produce results, planning began for a military operation. We look at the planning for the military assault and for the post-assault operations that would accompany the return of Aristide and the restoration of democracy to Haiti. The plan and concept for the assault was a *coup de main*, but one that used ground troops—Army, Marine, and Special Forces—for a precision strike in ways similar to the way airpower can be used for a precision strike. That plan needed to fit within the constraints imposed by the political, historical, cultural, and operational context.

Next, we look at the operational crux of the intervention: the 12 hours in September 1994 when diplomatic overtures resulted in the last-minute calling off of the assault and the metamorphosis of the invasion into an unopposed, permissive landing. In particular, we consider the technological opportunities provided by information systems available to the commander and the flexibility provided by basing the bulk of the assault force at sea.

Finally, we look at the nature of the actual operation and the match-up between its requirement for an understanding of the broader context and the technology available to develop, enhance, and communicate that understanding between levels of command and across organizations. The operation also required a contextual understanding and an ability to negotiate at all levels of command—characteristic requirements of recent operations other than war (OOTW).

This brings us full circle and demonstrates that future military operations will likely be “multidisciplinary,” that is, they will involve overlapping organizational and operations spaces. These operations will require commanders at all levels, including CINC planners and JTF executors, to understand the broader context, to work with the multitude of actors that influence the outcome, and to actively seek out nontraditional sources of information in order to actively shape the ultimate outcome of the operation. The RMA may be a revolution that involves transfer of civilian organizational and interpersonal concepts to the military as much as transfer of civilian technology.

Prelude: Political, economic, and information operations

On 29 September 1991, the Haitian military, led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cédras, overthrew the elected government of President Jean-Bertran Aristide. On 5 November 1991, President Bush imposed a U.S. trade embargo on Haiti. That embargo was the beginning of a series of sanctions against the Haitian government. In this section, we discuss the political, economic, and information operations mounted by the U.S. Government against the military government of Haiti. These operations combined both old and new ways of using methods other than military force to achieve national goals. Economic, diplomatic, and political sanctions were used for several years before the U.S. forces actually entered Haiti. Immediately before the operation, several information operations were conducted against the Haitian military government.⁵ These operations were designed to force the military rulers out without using direct force. However, the Haitian leaders did not agree to the U.S. and UN demands until overwhelming force was about to be used [33].

Although it is difficult to assess the possible effects of the various psychological, information, and economic operations on the military government, they apparently had only a marginal effect on removing Cédras from power. He did not back down until the strike had been launched; the threat of direct intervention appears to have been the ultimate trump.

5. Here we use the term “information operations” in a broad sense to include all efforts to accomplish the U.S. Government’s goals that involve information. This includes psychological operations—leaflet drops and radio broadcasts—and direct manipulation of information systems or processes.

Nevertheless, information operations and sanctions were an integral part of the overall campaign against the Haitian government. They were an attempt to solve the crisis peacefully, while giving the United States time to plan an extensive military operation. The diplomatic work enabled the United States to plan its operation with the support of the international community.

A campaign of isolation, sanctions, and information operations appears to be a common feature of many recent U.S. operations. The experience of Haiti suggests that campaigns involving nonmilitary sanctions need to consider both the culture and the individuals being targeted, as well as the role that the threat of force can play in the process.

Economic, political, and diplomatic isolation

International isolation of the Cédras military government began shortly after the coup that overthrew President Aristide. The Organization of American States (OAS) immediately called for Aristide's return and imposition of a trade embargo. The United Nations followed with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 467, calling for restoration of Aristide and support for OAS sanctions.

The economic and political pressure on the military government was steadily increased during the years between the coup and the intervention. UNSCR 841 and 873 imposed, and then reimposed, oil and arms sanctions against the military government [34, 35].

In the months before intervention, the United States took additional measures. On 22 June 1994, the Dominican Republic and U.S. forces fielded a multilateral observer group (MOG) to improve embargo enforcement on the Dominican Republic's border with Haiti [36]. The intervention occurred before the force could be fully deployed. On 23 June, the Clinton administration expanded an already existing freeze on the Haitian military's assets in the United States, to include those of all Haitians with assets in the United States [37]. And on 24 June, all commercial flights to and from Haiti were suspended [38].

During this time, the military government also became more isolated internationally. Eventually, among the Caribbean countries, only

Cuba opposed the U.S.-led intervention. Peace missions were cancelled, and Argentina and Colombia closed their missions in Port-au-Prince. This increasing pressure culminated on 30 August, when the 13-member Caribbean Community voted to support an invasion if economic and political sanctions failed to force the military government to leave [39].

In addition, the United States increased the political pressure on the Cédras regime. Measures included UNSCR 940, which authorized the United States to use all necessary means to remove the Haitian military government, and public predictions and discussions by the U.S. Government about when an invasion would occur.

As the time for the invasion drew nearer, discussion in the U.S. media of options and plans increased. On 2 August, the U.S. Government was said to be reviewing a series of plans. On 11 August, it indicated that U.S. troops would be required to stabilize Haiti even if the military government left. The public discussion peaked with President Clinton's address to the nation on 15 September and reports of offers to help the Cédras government leave without intervention.

Information and psychological operations

Information warfare and psychological operations were directed at both the people of Haiti and the military government.

Economic incentives

As early as 2 August, the Clinton administration debated whether and how to offer incentives for the ruling Haitian military leadership to leave [40, 41]. The Haitian military leadership was offered safe passage to other Latin American countries, with relocation expenses [40, 42]. Provisions for getting them out of the country in the face of opposition from other elements in the Haitian armed forces, a "reverse noncombatant evacuation" were also made. Reports indicated that no direct economic incentives would be provided to the leadership because they already had money available outside the country [42].

Leaflet and radio drops

On 13 and 14 September 1991, U.S. aircraft began leaflet drops over Haiti. The leaflets called for the support of the Haitian people against the military government, and announced the imminent return of President Aristide. On 15 September, aircraft dropped thousands of transistor radios to allow the Haitians to hear warning broadcasts from U.S. forces [43, 44].

In addition to the radio and leaflet drops, radio messages were broadcast from "Radio Democracy" on board an EC-130 aircraft. Low-altitude aircraft flights and demonstrations by warships in Port-au-Prince harbor also began in August 1994 [44-47].

These efforts were relatively ineffective for several reasons. First, the opposition to the Haitian military was already energized before the leaflet and radio campaign began. In fact, Haitian-on-Haitian violence between supporters of President Aristide and the supporters of the military government would become a problem for U.S. forces during the early stages of the intervention [48-50].

Second, as civil-affairs units later found out, Haiti is fundamentally a rumor-based society [51]. The Haitians distrust the media and central authority, which reduced the effectiveness of messages distributed by these methods.

Timing

Uphold Democracy involved two time scales. After the coup that brought the military to power in Haiti, the time scale for action was based on weeks, months, and even years. Nearly 3 years passed after the coup before the United States intervened with military force. During that time, commanders, the CINC, and the National Command Authority (NCA) could afford to implement operations that would take a long time to succeed.

Time can also be important to the forces involved in operations such as Uphold Democracy. Time allows for the following:

- *Planning.* The long lead time for the operation allowed USACOM and the 18th Airborne Corps to carefully develop

their plans and options. Much of the flexibility that occurred during the entry phase of the operation was attributed to the careful planning that had gone into the operation.

- *Training.* The Marines, Special Forces, and airborne forces held several exercises in the months leading up to the operation. The long lead time gave the forces time to rehearse the operation.
- *Understanding.* If forces and command elements are able to loiter near the operation, they can use personal experience and intelligence-collection methods to develop a better understanding of the operating environment. Similarly, more lead time can give the indigenous population (in this case the Haitians) time to understand U.S. government intentions and the rationale for its course of action.

Time, and the cumulative effects of the economic sanctions, made the U.S. intervention appear positive to Haitian nationals [2]. It made it more likely that the operation would be accepted as a good thing, rather than resisted as an act of U.S. imperialism. Without the time for sanctions to work (and fail) and information operations to take place, the U.S. forces might have met with more resistance from both the Haitian military government and some segments of the population. Instead, the intervention was accepted as a positive development.

Thus, the time used to pursue a coordinated campaign of economic and diplomatic sanctions contributed to the Haitian perception that the U.S. military intervention was "morally neutral, politically feasible, and materially necessary" [2]. In short, the attention given to the broader economic and political context within Haiti probably contributed to the capitulation of the Cédras regime and prepared the way for a positive reception for U.S. troops, improving the success of the military component of U.S. activities in Haiti.

The plan

Uphold Democracy consisted of two operations: what happened before U.S. troops entered Haiti, and what happened afterward.

The time period before the United States entered Haiti was dominated by planning and rehearsal for a *coup de main*, a direct neutralization of the Haitian military and the government it supported. The concept of a *coup de main* was consistent with past operations in the Caribbean, where the United States had an overwhelming superiority of forces compared to poorly equipped authoritarian governments. It was also consistent with the Powell doctrine of tying military action to political objectives and ensuring that overwhelming force was used to meet those objectives. In Haiti, this meant removing the Cédras government while minimizing casualties [52]. And U.S. military superiority would allow ground forces to strike precisely those elements of the Haitian military that kept it in power.

Coup de main

At 1900L on 18 September, elements of the 82nd Airborne left Pope Air Force Base on board C-141 and C-130 transports. They were headed toward the Port-au-Prince airport and two drop zones north of the city [53]. Sixty helicopters and the 82nd's aviation brigade were waiting to launch from Great Iguana Island in the Bahamas [53]. U.S. Marines off the coast of Cap Haitien were ready to seize the port and airfield on the north coast of Haiti [54]. Special Operations Forces and U.S. Army Rangers were standing by on aircraft carriers ready to target a wide range of weapons, forces, and elements of the military government. A Battalion Combat Team of the 10th Mountain Division was standing by on board USS *Eisenhower* as a heavy reserve force to augment the airborne forces.

These forces would move ashore by airborne drop (the 82nd), helicopter (Special Forces, Rangers, 10th Mountain), small boat, and

amphibious-landing vehicles (Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF)). Some forces were already ashore, marking airborne and amphibious landing zones, at the start of the operation [53, 55].

At 2030L, President Clinton announced that he had accepted the Carter delegation's accord with the Haitian military government [6]. The Carter-Cédras accord called for General Cédras and his military government to step down within a month. The airborne forces were recalled and a new plan was put into place. This plan combined the forcible entry that was about to occur with the follow-on forces that were to take over after the country was secured. It called for the 10th Mountain Division to spearhead the entry into Port-au-Prince. On 19 September, General Shelton, the JTF commander, along with elements of the 10th Mountain Division, arrived at the Port-au-Prince airport.

The planned, and almost executed, operation was a classic *coup de main*. The 82nd Airborne, Marine forces, Army Rangers, and other special forces were targeted against the airports, government and communications facilities, and army and police units [56]. Special Forces units were designed to secure weapons and the military leadership at the outset of the operation [56, 57].

The U.S. military has conducted similar operations in the past in the Dominican Republic (Power Pack) [58], Grenada (Urgent Fury) [59], and Panama (Just Cause) [60]. Just Cause was the operation most similar to that planned for Uphold Democracy, and planners attempted to incorporate many of the lessons learned from Just Cause into Haitian operations.

All of these operations represent an evolving concept of how ground forces can be used in forcible-entry operations.

What was important?

Speed, mobility, simultaneity, and a combination of technical and human intelligence are all hallmarks of Special Forces operations [61]. They have been using these tactics since before World War II.

The idea is to use maneuver, surprise, and precision to overcome the assaulting force's vulnerabilities. In previous operations, Special Forces have been susceptible to being engaged with heavy weapons or superior formations. In Haiti, U.S. forces had superiority in both numbers and weapons. Their vulnerability was political; they needed to minimize both U.S. and Haitian casualties.

A linear, or sequential, approach to a forcible-entry operation, such as was done in Grenada, would have called for landings on the beaches, and fighting toward specific objectives inland. Instead, plans for Haiti called for all significant targets to be engaged within a short period of time. Hitting all of the targets with infantry at the same time allowed the JTF commander's strategic, operational, and tactical objectives to merge into one single operation.

In scenarios such as the one in Haiti, where minimizing damage to friendly forces and civilians is a strategic imperative, it is important to be able to precisely and effectively target specific elements of the opposition's power. In Desert Storm, the United States tried to accomplish this by using air power. In Haiti, USACOM and the JTF commander planned to use a combination of Marines, airmobile infantry, and Special Forces in the same way.

Precision force

One concept included in the revolution in military affairs is the ability to identify and target enemy forces and infrastructure so precisely that they can be disrupted as a *system*, and not merely one at a time [5]. The idea of disrupting the system and not meeting the enemy head on started at the tactical and operational levels of war with the German *strosstrupen*⁶ of World War I and the *blitzkrieg* of World War II, wherein tactical formations sought to enter and disrupt the rear areas of other military forces.

The concept of disruption applied at a strategic level was developed during the early days of air power. Air power theorists have always considered the use of air power against the enemy's social, industrial, and military infrastructure as a way of winning through direct attack on the enemy's ability and will to fight [63].

Desert Storm saw many of the theories of air power and its effects on strategic disruption combined with modern precision targeting and weapons delivery systems. The Desert Storm air campaign loosely followed the principles outlined by recent air-power theorists, primarily Colonel John Warden, who was involved in the early planning of the air war [64-66].

Warden's theories call for the simultaneous strike on all of the enemy's systems and command elements. The goal is to shock the system into uncontrolled, reflexive responses. Loss of one system, such as electrical power, can affect many other linked systems, for example, command and control. Destruction of the links between systems can magnify the effects of attacks on even a small set of targets.

6. Infiltration tactics that grew out of trench raiding were used by both sides later in the war with more or less success [62].

The concept of a devastating, instantaneous, and simultaneous precision strike can be extended to operations involving ground forces. Ground forces can combine precise intelligence with air and sea mobility or infiltration tactics to accomplish many of the same missions as air power. In operations such as Uphold Democracy, where people rather than infrastructure are the primary targets, ground forces may be more effective than air power. The *coup de main* is one form that ground forces can use to attack the enemy system, as opposed to engaging his forces directly in a linear assault.

A *coup de main* focuses simultaneously on hitting all the critical command-and-control and other elements of an enemy's forces with light, fast troops. These troops can arrive on scene through air drop, helicopter, or amphibious assault. In Haiti, U.S. Army forces and Special Forces were planning to use all three [53, 56].

When considering the role of air, ground, and heliborne forces in operations such as Uphold Democracy, the crucial issues are the *degree* of precision and the *accessibility* of the targets.

In some operations, such as Desert Storm, most targets can be identified with conventional sensors and may move infrequently, if at all. Examples would be command-and-control bunkers, airfields, and power plants. These targets are perfect for the use of reconnaissance and strike. They can be identified, located, and struck with aircraft or rocket-delivered ordnance.

On the other hand, some systems and targets cannot be easily targeted and destroyed using air power. In Desert Storm, the SCUD transporter erector launchers (TELs) were an example of a small, highly mobile target that was difficult to locate and destroy. In operations such as those planned for Uphold Democracy, these types of targets are predominant. Most of the potential targets in Haiti were leaders, groups of troops, and small weapons. Such targets can be easily dispersed, moved, or hidden.

Locating these easily hidden targets requires greater precision. Commanders and forces need more frequent position updates. Individual leaders may need to be monitored hourly, or by the minute, unlike power stations, which do not move during the entire campaign.

Targets in operations such as those planned for Uphold Democracy are often small; therefore, they can be dispersed among the civilian population. If a strategic objective is to minimize collateral damage, forces should have access to the targets with a minimum chance of hitting the wrong target, and they need to use only minimum force. Ground forces, particularly Special Forces, can both access and identify dispersed or hidden targets more easily than aircraft can.

These considerations lead to an analogy: In Haiti, airborne and Special Forces performed many of the roles air power would play in conventional air operations in support of a major regional contingency (MRC). Plans called for U.S. forces in Haiti to simultaneously target all of the important infrastructure, forces, and command elements that were supporting the Haitian military government.

The ability to target strategic systems and infrastructure using remote weapons and air power will allow, in some concepts, the immobilization and decapitation of enemy forces. The same principle applied to a less-sophisticated, less-well-equipped enemy would have light forces seizing critical leadership and infrastructure before an enemy's heavy forces could react. In Haiti, all of the requirements for a successful *coup de main* were in the forcible-entry plans [61].

We will examine the following in more detail:

- Social infrastructure
- Size
- Surprise
- Capability
- Intelligence.

Social infrastructure

In the previous paragraphs, we have used Desert Storm as an example of a conflict where air power played a substantial role. Air power was able to target Iraq's complex and interconnected economic and command infrastructures. Although Iraqi ground forces also were

attacked (the final plan for Desert Storm integrated strategic, operational, and tactical air operations), the primary focus of the initial strategic attacks was the command-and-control and support infrastructure for the Iraqi government and military forces.

In Haiti, there was little infrastructure to attack. Instead, the power of the military government lay with its heavy weapons and its forces and supporters. Targeting these forces meant that the plans in Haiti were really targeting the *social* infrastructure, the people, symbols, and even ideas behind the power structure of the country, as much as the physical infrastructure.

Attacks on the social infrastructure began with economic and diplomatic pressures early in the campaign. They continued with various forms of information warfare directed toward the Haitian people and military forces. Finally, the plans called for attacking the military and paramilitary forces supporting the government.

When the social infrastructure is intermixed with civilian society, as was the case in Haiti, direct attacks become difficult. Instead, ground forces and information operations are required in order to sort through what is a legitimate target and what is not. This sorting process continued in Haiti even after plans were changed, as U.S. troops and commanders dealt with the regular and paramilitary forces that had supported the military government.

Size

One requirement for an effective *coup de main* is that lightly equipped infantry forces can engage and defeat the enemy's centers of gravity with minimal losses. This can be accomplished in many ways, depending on the enemy. You can use an *overwhelming mobile* force, *surprise*, or a more *capable* force. Or, as was planned for Haiti, you can use all three.

Scale of operations

The size of the U.S. force that was almost used against the Haitian military was overwhelming. The drop of the 82nd Airborne was to be the largest airborne operation since Operation Market Garden in World

War II [53]. All types of forces were used, from Special Forces to Marines to Army helicopter assault and airborne troops. More than 18,000 troops were involved in Uphold Democracy, 4,000 in the airborne assault alone [53].

These forces were to be matched against a Haitian army that had few working heavy weapons, little training in modern combat, and limited motivation. Estimates put the forces at 6,500 troops and 1,200 police, with six armored vehicles, a few machine guns and mortars, and a tiny air force and navy [67].

Despite all the operational and strategic warning given the Haitian military and leadership, their destruction was all but inevitable, mainly because of the tremendous disparity of forces between the Haitian and U.S. military. The combination of U.S. Special Forces, 82nd Airborne, U.S. Marines, and other forces provided an overwhelming ratio of U.S. troops to Haitian forces.

The overwhelming force used against the Haitian military achieved at least two goals: absolute intimidation of the opposition, thus minimizing fighting and casualties, and sufficient troops to simultaneously strike many different targets. To execute the type of attacks that were called for—precision engagements of the right targets with minimum casualties and collateral damage—the United States had to use sufficient forces to engage all the targets.

Plans called for forces in the Port-au-Prince area to simultaneously attack and disable the airfields, the military regime's command-and-control nodes (such as they were), the naval bases, the troop barracks, and the police stations. In the Cap Haitien region, the Marines were to secure both the port and the airfield, along with the town itself.

Scale was also important in the Special Forces' portion of the operation. They played a critical role, both in the planned and executed operation. In the planned assault, they were able to target multiple sites and provide reserves in case an *in extremis* NEO was required. The NEO option became important because the Carter delegation was in Haiti while preparations and deployments were being made for an assault.

Surprise

Strategic

Given the buildup that occurred in Haiti, strategic surprise was virtually impossible. The military government of Haiti was amply warned of U.S. intentions, often directly by the U.S. Government. Ironically, the enemy has been warned more often than not in past Special Forces operations [61].

In the months before the operation, a series of exercises were held by both the Marines and the Army [68-70]. In a very visible event, the aircraft carrier, USS *Eisenhower*, and the command ship, USS *Mount Whitney* (preceded by USS *America*), sailed from Norfolk on 14 and 15 September [6]. On 15 September, President Clinton addressed the nation, giving our reasons for the intervention [71]. Finally, as negotiations were taking place with the Carter delegation, General Raul Cédras was informed that the 82nd Airborne had taken off from Pope Air Force Base.

Operational

Operational surprise can be attained when all targets are attacked at virtually the same time, and no part of the opposition has enough time to react by evasion or counter-attack.

Light infantry and Special Forces can be vulnerable to large enemy units or heavy weapons. This vulnerability can become even more pronounced when casualties must be minimized. In addition to going in with a large force, light forces can protect themselves by hitting the enemy before his heavy forces, if he has any, can react.

One way to avoid reaction by the enemy is to strike all the targets within the expected reaction time of the enemy's command-and-control capabilities. In Haiti, the command-and-control capabilities of the military government were minimal. In addition, there was no

effective fixed-wing or helicopter force that would allow for quick reaction to an assault.⁷

However, the presence of many poorly armed, but still potentially hostile, Haitian combatants still presented a threat to U.S. forces. This fact, combined with the U.S. desire to minimize both Haitian and U.S. casualties, made surprise and simultaneity necessary in Haiti.

Forces were scheduled to land on all objectives within a few hours of the start of the operation. In most cases, objectives would be assaulted and secured at the same time [72]. Several things made this degree of coordination between dispersed forces possible:

- *Communications.* Many different communications systems were deployed in Haiti. Most relied on high-bandwidth satellite links to move traffic between the United States, ships offshore, and the Haitian mainland. The largest bandwidth capability was on board U.S. ships offshore. Video teleconferencing (VTC) and switched-voice circuits tied into the commercial telephone system allowed staffs on board ships to work closely with forces ashore and in the United States in order to coordinate the arrival of forces coming into the country from the U.S. mainland, Cuba, the Bahamas, and offshore [73, 74].
- *Global Positioning System (GPS) and precision navigation.* The GPS allowed troops and aircraft to closely align their positions and times. For example, the transports of the 82nd Airborne were led by C-130 aircraft equipped with the Adverse Weather Aerial Delivery System along with GPS [53].
- *Deliberate planning.* The operation had been preplanned for more than a year. This allowed time for careful planning and rehearsals [68–70].

7. The Haitian air force was estimated to consist of three to five trainer/Cessna type aircraft and six helicopters, most of which were thought to be inoperable [67].

Tactical

At the tactical level, surprise would have been achieved as follows:

- *Speed.* The inability of the Haitian forces to track or target aircraft allowed airmobile forces to show up without warning. The Haitian forces' lack of any airmobile or much mechanized capability also limited their ability to react to airmobile forces.
- *Night operations.* The drops and attacks were scheduled to begin during the early morning hours.

Capability

Fire support

Besides having tactical surprise and overwhelming numbers, U.S. forces were able to use overwhelming force. Helicopter gunship support, in addition to being an integral component of air assault doctrine, allowed forces to bring reserve forces to bear on resistant targets. Although they were never used, the gunships provided the following:

- Moderate levels of force. Cannon and rockets allowed forces to bring proportionate force to bear where ordnance delivered by fixed-wing aircraft would have been excessive.
- Long loiter times. Gunships could loiter in the vicinity, providing both visibility and situational awareness for crews and ground forces. The gunships' ability to intimidate opposing forces can be just as important as their combat capability.

Fixed-wing aircraft also provided fire support mostly through AC-130 gunship flights in support of Special Forces units. Although these can direct considerable fire in support of ground forces, they are inherently less visible than helicopters. This reduces their ability to intimidate the opposition.

Command and control

Command and control is what enables forces to conduct large-scale simultaneous assault operations. Troops in the field must be able to coordinate their actions, and to receive continuous updates on the location and status of targets.

Before the assault, the communications connectivity between staffs and assault forces was robust. High-bandwidth SHF SATCOM links between ships offshore and forces in the United States and elsewhere enabled the JTF and other staffs to communicate with the CINC, other staffs ashore (such as the Air Component Commander at Pope AFB in North Carolina), and the forces as they prepared for the assault. The commanders' ability to call off the assault at the last minute reflects this operational-level connectivity.

Once the permissive entry began, however, the connectivity between forces afloat, in the United States, and the Army forces ashore was problematic [1, 75]. Army systems are not necessarily designed to work from ships, and Navy ships did not always have the antenna or frequency coverage required [75].

Without tactical command connectivity, coordinated assault operations are planned well in advance and rehearsed; they are difficult to modify in real time. But the problem of detecting, tracking, and assaulting small, highly mobile targets requires real-time updates on target location and intentions. It also requires the forces to be able to coordinate their actions in real time.

Mobility

One significant advantage U.S. troops had was their air mobility. A *coup de main* such as the one planned for Haiti requires the ability to drop troops at precisely the right time and in the right location. In the past, this has been accomplished by using airborne or glider troops. Airborne troops can cover large distances using fixed-wing aircraft.

However, airborne assaults do not provide the precision required for instantaneous takedown of resisting targets. Nor is it as easy to coordinate precision fires with only fixed-wing aircraft. The helicopter

mobility provided in Uphold Democracy allowed forces to be delivered to the targets ready for immediate action.

Intelligence

If the infrastructure, both social and physical, that supports a threat government is to be neutralized, then commanders and planners need to know at least the following about its components:

- Their location
- Their ability to resist
- Their intentions.

This is the traditional function of military intelligence. However, in operations such as Uphold Democracy, the requirement for speed of intelligence collection and dissemination may be increased to meet the demands of highly mobile forces. Similarly, the nature of the intelligence collected can change to account for the complicated and non-traditional nature of the operation. These can require detailed and in-depth intelligence collection, as well as flexibility to follow the plans and forces as the situation changes.

Location

In a developed country such as Iraq, which has a substantial infrastructure and a large, organized military, infrastructure and units can be targeted by using national reconnaissance capabilities on board satellites and aircraft. The targets are large and the location of units and facilities can change only over a period of days or weeks.

For example, to move and position an armored brigade or division requires extensive communications, movement of large columns of trucks and tanks, and some infrastructure changes (e.g., bunkers, service areas, and bed-down locations) to the site just vacated and the site that is being occupied. These can all be detected by units in the theater or at the national level.

But when small units of 10 to 20 men are moving, this is not necessarily the case; they can move in minutes or hours and the effect of their

movement on the environment may be minimal. They can also take advantage of cover and opportunities for deception that may not be available to large units, e.g., changing to civilian clothes (as was done in Haiti [76]), or occupying civilian buildings.

In Haiti, the targets were often more disorganized than military formations. They included police and other paramilitary units as well as the military. In addition, in operations such as Uphold Democracy, forces can also target the leadership and its immediate supporters.⁸

To locate and track small units and weapons in an urban environment requires information from "eyes on the ground." Sources can be embassy personnel, people in the country—either local or undercover—or Special Forces inserted before an operation. In Haiti, the United States deployed the Defense Human Intelligence Service (DHS) in direct support of the USACOM and 18th Airborne Corps. Human intelligence was an important feature of the Haiti operations [77–79].

If the assaulting ground forces are mobile, the intelligence regarding the location and disposition of threat forces must match the speed with which all forces can maneuver, and the precision with which friendly forces can engage the targets. This can become a challenge when friendly forces are capable of moving via helicopter, landing craft, or vehicles.

In an environment such as the one in Haiti, opposition forces can use the infrastructure in different ways, which can often be misleading. For example, communications facilities can be unused or irrelevant to the government and military forces. Barracks, weapons, weapons stations, and police stations may be abandoned or used only minimally without much overt evidence that they have been abandoned.

8. There was some debate, however, in the popular press and unclassified sources as to whether the leadership in Haiti was targeted. One of the lessons learned from Just Cause was not to get bogged down in a hunt for individuals. But when individuals are so intimately connected with the objectives of the mission, it is difficult to separate them completely [72].

On the ground, precise in-country intelligence can be important in establishing an infrastructure target set, as well as for determining the priority for various infrastructure targets. An example would be the Navy Sea-Air-Land (SEAL) team's reconnaissance of the Cap Haitien airfield [80].

Capability and intentions

Intelligence in complex situations, such as those that occurred before and after the intervention in Haiti, requires more than the geographic coordinates of the targets. Awareness of the threat's intentions and value are also necessary. U.S. troops can be helped by an understanding of how individuals and small units will react to the initial phases of an assault. For example, if the leadership is a primary target, knowing its location immediately before an assault is important, but knowing what it could do during an assault allows forces to block escape routes and close off alternatives. Troops faced with leaders who threaten suicide may need to take actions that are different from the actions necessary when they are faced with leaders who might flee or hide.

When dealing with *individuals*, or units small enough to behave as individuals, intelligence producers may need to think more like detectives than targeteers. Various clues about behavior, intentions, and capabilities can be combined to directly support the assault forces.

A tight link between intelligence producers, the situation on the ground, and the assault forces allows the intelligence producers to build a complete picture of what is occurring in the operation. By complete, we mean not merely the target's location and capabilities but also the ability to link information about the target with other disparate but related pieces of information.

In this operation, the systems and technology existed to combine diverse intelligence sources into a unified picture [77, 81]. The 18th Airborne Corps Analysis Control Element (ACE) was located in the Joint Intelligence Center on board USS *Mount Whitney*. Databases of intelligence products were maintained both at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina, and on board USS *Mount Whitney* [81].

The last minute shift and the role of naval forces

At 2000L on 18 September, General Sheldon was commanding the planned military takedown of the government of Haiti. At 0900L on 19 September, he arrived by helicopter at Port-au-Prince airport to work out the details of a departure agreement with the military government. His role had changed from warrior to diplomat in the space of 13 hours.

The change left both the USACOM staff back in Norfolk and the JTF staff on board *Mount Whitney* in an interesting position. Their plans called for either a permissive entry, or an assault, followed by a permissive security operation. None of the initial plans envisioned that the military government would still be in place when U.S. follow-on forces (the 10th Mountain Division) entered Haiti.

In order to change the plans in the space of 13 hours, the staffs on board the ships needed both facilities and connectivity with decision-makers and staffs back in the United States. They also needed the flexibility to substitute heliborne forces (from the 10th Mountain Division) for the airborne assault that had just been called off.

Even though the original plans called for the 10th Mountain Division to hold back until days after the air assault, they were on board *Eisenhower* and available. Planners were also on board *Mount Whitney* and capable of communicating with USACOM and other staffs, including the 10th Mountain, in the area. They were also present and within helicopter range of the Army and Marine Corps staffs.

This section considers what naval forces contributed to both the planned assault and the transition to a permissive entry into Haiti. Three characteristics of naval forces were instrumental to both the war plan and the OOTW that actually occurred. These are proximity, flexibility, and communications. One real strength of naval forces is that they provide the policy-maker with a wider range of choices than simply "go," or "no go."

The decision can range from "go" to "wait while we try another round of negotiations," to visible muscle-flexing offshore. These options are available because naval forces can loiter nearby without the need to negotiate base access with other countries. At the same time, new technology has turned the naval flagship into a true command ship, providing communications channels to dispersed joint forces, diplomats ashore, the theater CINC, and policy-makers in Washington.

Proximity

The assault operation was to be conducted entirely by airborne, airmobile, and amphibious forces.⁹ Except for support from gunships, air attacks were neither planned nor needed. The ground forces went into the assault phase prepared to have the same effect that airpower would in a conventional operation. Because strategic surprise was not possible, many forces were required to ensure minimum casualties.

These ground forces required numerous helicopters for transport and fire support, which in turn requires access to bases. Not only were bases needed for the assault operation, they were also required during the time leading up to the operation. Troops had to rehearse and prepare for the assault. And the NCA needed a secure and less-visible base for Special Forces' preparations and operations.

In Haiti, a combination of ships and island bases were used. But some basing was less than ideal. When the assault did not materialize, troops on Great Iguana quickly began running out of water and food [57]. Although not an insurmountable problem, it did result in some restriction on how the base could be used. Guantanamo also had limited space for stationing forces.

Thus, ships became the primary platform for airmobile operations, for both the Army and the Marine Corps. A Marine Expeditionary Unit was stationed offshore for most of the time period leading up to

9. This does not mean that fixed-wing aircraft were not involved, only that they did not play a direct role in the assault. Combat air patrols were stationed near Cuba; Air Force transport aircraft carried paratroopers; and other aircraft, including AC-130 and A-10 aircraft, were available for fire support.

the intervention. It provided an assault capability and the ability to conduct a short notice noncombatant evacuation. Army and Special Forces arrived on board USS *Eisenhower* and USS *America* as the time for the intervention approached.

During the invasion of Grenada, a linear strategy was pursued. Forces landed at both ends of the island, with the goal of meeting in the middle. In Haiti, forces were planning to assault multiple objectives simultaneously. At a minimum, a linear campaign in Haiti would have been far more difficult because of the terrain and the lack of good roads.

But landing everywhere at once requires immediate access to all targets. Heliborne forces, in particular, need bases within range of their targets. Also, if—as occurred in the initial stages of the planned and actual operation—the air assault forces need to move equipment ashore by helicopter, the assault base and the landing area need to be as close as possible to enable the helicopters to minimize their flying time [75].

Flexibility

As the time for military operations approached, the time scale narrowed. Forces moved into position within weeks. Information operations started with radio broadcasts to the Haitian people in July 1994 [46]. Leaflet drops and more urgent forms of political intimidation started a week before the operation [44, 47]. USS *Mount Whitney* left Norfolk 3 days before the operation began [6]. General Shelton boarded *Mount Whitney* in Guantanamo on the morning of 18 September, about 12 hours before the operation. He remained on board *Mount Whitney* during the operation's early phases and until command functions were transferred ashore.

Naval forces gave the commanders in Haiti the flexibility to scale the pace of their operations to their strategic goals. The ability to move forces into the area of operations within days, and a substantial C4I system (*Mount Whitney*), enabled the NCA to react to changes in the diplomatic, information, and economic campaigns. *Mount Whitney* enabled the JTF commander to stay connected with the CINC and NCA while remaining within a helicopter ride of his forces.

The forces offshore also gave the NCA the flexibility to allow the Carter delegation to enter the country to pursue a last-minute peaceful settlement. With many Special Forces and other troops stationed just offshore, the reaction time of a rescue mission would have been minimized.

Communications and information

The ability to be flexible in planning and execution was facilitated by the communications capability on board *Mount Whitney*. Many different communications systems were deployed in Haiti. Most relied on high-bandwidth satellite links to move traffic between the United States, ships offshore, and the Haitian mainland. The largest bandwidth capability in the vicinity of Haiti was on board U.S. ships offshore. Video-teleconferencing (VTC) and switched-voice circuits tied into the commercial telephone system allowed staffs on board ships to work closely with forces in the United States [73, 74]. The proximity of the command element to the operation, in turn, allowed the staffs to work closely with the forces once they were ashore.

Information can be used by the commander in at least two ways:

- First, it can be used directly against the enemy to influence those in a position to make the changes the U.S. Government desires, or it can be used directly against individuals in the enemy government to induce them to acquiesce to U.S. plans. In Uphold Democracy, this was done through leaflet drops and radio broadcasts. It was also used indirectly through economic, military, and political intimidation.
- Information can also be used in other ways to accomplish a commander's objectives. This concept goes beyond traditional intelligence—information about friendly or neutral organizations can be even more important to the commander than information about the threat. Access to a wide variety of information, in detail and in real time, can enable a commander and his staff to constantly change their overall operational plan in reaction to or anticipation of change in the environment. Communications that provide, not only the substance, but the

nuance of the commander's decisions, such as telephone or VTC, can allow subordinate commands to adapt and react to rapid changes at the operational level.

Operation Uphold Democracy provides a good example of this combination of communications connectivity and an information-rich environment.¹⁰

- Access to Haitians and Haiti before and during the operation gave U.S. forces the opportunity to develop an understanding of both the target set and the political and social situations on the ground. Commanders and troops could update their assessment of the situation on the ground within the limits of the communications connectivity and the organizations' ability to move the information. In execution, this was not seamless or without problems, the main problem being the coordination of intelligence collection across organizations in real time [1].
- VTC, telephone, and networked computers allowed operational plans to be reconfigured based on strategic changes. The final plan for the operation was constructed within 13 hours of the Carter-Cédras agreement. It had to be reconfigured because that agreement put U.S. forces in a security situation that differed from their expectations.

10. Neither the communications connectivity with forces, nor the ability to acquire and process a lot of information, was fully deployed in the operation. VTC and other communications were bandwidth limited and tradeoffs had to be made. The ability to fuse operational-level information in large networked information systems was primitive or, in the case of JTF components, nonexistent. Here, the direction information systems are taking is the important factor.

Command and context

The Carter delegation's agreement with the Cédras government presented U.S. ground commanders with a situation that differed from their original plans: The military government they were in Haiti to depose would be around for another month. Thus, U.S. commanders had to enter into an uneasy relationship with the military government. They had to discuss what the Haitian military should be doing, and what it should not be doing. The U.S. military leadership was faced with a situation that involved an intact government with some, if only notional, force of international and Haitian law on its side.

This is one example of the complex environment the CINC and JTF commander faced when they were planning for and executing Uphold Democracy. They had to balance a wide range of forces to accomplish the U.S. military and diplomatic missions.

The parts of an operation that exist outside the military—the political, social, and diplomatic—can be important to operational success. In some types of operations, even those that involve significant violence, outside factors may determine the success or failure of the operation. The JTF commander must be aware of this broader context. He is challenged with developing a plan for working within the constraints, and satisfying all the various explicit and implicit criteria for success imposed by outside forces.

As the one who is in command of all on-scene joint military forces, the JTF commander is the on-scene link between the operation and everything else. If technology and other forces are causing dramatic changes in social institutions and organizations, the JTF commander is one of the primary links between those changes and the military operation.

First, we'll look at some of the constraints imposed on the military operation in Uphold Democracy. Such constraints appear to be a common feature of many recent operations.

Political context

In any operation, some forces outside the military chain of command have a special interest in the overall outcome of the operation. These include political decision-makers, and the media who help create the domestic political context for the operation. In the following sections, we discuss some of the more important political factors influencing the plan and operation in Haiti.¹¹

Congressional opposition to intervention

During the early phases of operations in Haiti, in 1993 and early 1994, the effects of U.S. troop losses in Somalia on public and Congressional opinion were being felt [82]. Later, Congressional criticism of the potential operation centered on doubts as to whether the national interests required intervention [83].

Once U.S. troops were in Haiti, however, Congressional concern turned from questions of national interests to when the troops would be coming home. On 20 September, both the House and Senate passed a resolution calling for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Haiti as soon as possible [84]. When it became clear that the operation was going to be somewhat successful, however, the pressure for a specific withdrawal date decreased. Nevertheless, several efforts were made to set withdrawal dates, such as 1 March, or even as early as Thanksgiving 1994 [85-87].

How did Congressional action affect operations?

- It put pressure on the administration to finish the operation quickly, or at least to get the bulk of the forces out as soon as possible.

11. Additional material pertaining to the issues discussed in this section can be found in [2, 3].

- It sought a mission statement that clearly stated the reasons for involvement in terms of U.S. national interests, not just Haitian national interests. A clear mission statement, one that accounts for the desired end state, has been found to be important to military commanders structuring humanitarian assistance operations [88].

No casualties

The U.S. Government focused on minimizing U.S. casualties because it feared it might lose support for a mission that was already unpopular with the public [89].¹²

The emphasis on minimizing casualties in Haiti had several effects on the plan and the operation. As has become the rule, the U.S. forces deployed for the operation were overwhelmingly superior to the opposition they faced.

Once in Haiti, commanders were concerned with force protection, to the point where troops were often isolated from both friendly and hostile elements to ensure the U.S. forces' security [3].

Nation building and mission creep

Mission creep was a serious worry for senior U.S. officials during the operation [91]. Commanders' concerns for force safety and humanitarian impulses conflicted with the political desire to avoid an increased role for U.S. troops in the daily administration and support of Haitians. The result was a sporadic series of efforts to help the Haitians early in the operation.

12. A *New York Times* poll in September 1994 on the intervention in Haiti showed a 41-percent favorable, and a 52-percent negative rating before the operation [90]. *Newsweek* and CNN/Gallup polls showed even lower levels of public support, with 34 percent in favor and 57 percent opposed (*Newsweek*) [83], or 32 percent in favor and 59 percent opposed (CNN/Gallup). This compares with 74/21 for Somalia (December 1992) [90].

U.S. troops provided some infrastructure rebuilding and civil project help to the Haitians. Primarily, the work was done by the Marines in Cap Haitien and some Army troops operating independently from the main force [92–95]. But these efforts, often justified as improving relations with locals, and thus contributing to the safety of the force, were not widely sanctioned by either the military or civilian commanders.

This reflects two differing views of force protection: You can protect the troops by making friends and changing the environment for the better, or by isolating the troops from potentially harmful situations. These two approaches are somewhat incompatible because working for change in the environment means that the troops will be in exposed positions.

These differing approaches also reflect the competing demands between the stated mission of restoring the legitimate government and the broader mission of improving the lives of ordinary Haitians.

Haitian culture

Besides constraints from domestic politics, commanders had to work within limits posed by Haiti's culture and history. Understanding the society of a country in which a military force is intervening is always important. Haiti's relationship with the United States is long and complex [96]. Haitian culture and politics also are complex, and Haiti has a long history of violence. The question of when and how U.S. troops were inserted into Haiti was important. The delay and sanctions allowed the Haitian people to realize that there were few alternatives to a U.S. intervention. And a permissive entry avoided a direct confrontation between U.S. forces and the Haitians' national pride. What the U.S. forces did once they arrived was also important.

The use of leaflets and radio in a rumor-based society, as discussed earlier, is one example of how mismatches between operational-level decisions and the culture of Haiti can have unexpected consequences.

Another example is the Haitians' expectations regarding the role of military forces. In Haiti, there are no clear distinctions between the military and the police. Haitians were expecting U.S. forces to offer police and judicial services, but initially U.S. forces were not permitted to perform policing functions [2]. This position evolved, however, when U.S. forces had to gradually assume more police functions as it became clear that the Haitian police force had disintegrated.

As the operation progressed, military police and International Police Monitors (IPMs) were used to monitor Haitian police activities [97]. But they were limited to working with the existing Haitian police and making sure human rights were not abused (though they sometimes went beyond the role of mere monitors) [3].

The permissive entry established an inherently contradictory set of pressures on U.S. forces. The Haitian government and police were still in place, which meant that U.S. forces had to work with those who, only a few days before, had been oppressing the Haitian people. Fearing "mission creep," the U.S. Government limited the ability of its troops to establish order and prevent violence, and the civilian monitors were limited by their charter in their ability to intervene and stop violence. Nevertheless, Haitian civilians expected the U.S. forces to enforce the rule of law, and the broader national and international audiences were shocked by the Haitian-on-Haitian violence.

During the first days after U.S. forces entered Haiti, violent acts between Haitians put pressure on the United States to take steps to limit Haitian-on-Haitian violence. There were two general responses: U.S. forces began intervening more frequently to stop Haitian-on-Haitian violence, and they began training a Haitian police force. The Justice Department's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and the IPMs also trained an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) made up of "vetted" Forces Armée d'Haiti (FAd'H) personnel and Haitians from the Guantanamo refugee camps [3].

In the short term, neither of these accomplished what was needed most: to establish a working judicial system within Haiti. The civil functions that were restored early in the operation were done on an ad hoc basis by troops working independently in the field [3, 94].

The evolution of the operation

Finally, the way the operation evolved required the commander to rapidly understand the new environment and adapt plans and forces accordingly.

The permissive entry

If the forcible-entry option had been exercised and the military government of Haiti had been deposed, or if the military leadership had fled before the operation, U.S. forces would have been in control of Haiti. But neither event happened.

Instead, the Carter-Cédras accord left the military government of Haiti intact, and U.S. troops were left in the country. This change affected the operation in several ways.

The most dramatic effect was in the public-security situation on the streets of Port-au-Prince. Because the U.S. forces were in a country where there was, at least technically, a functioning legal system and police force, the U.S. forces' ability to intervene in purely criminal situations was limited [76, 98, 99]. In fact, according to Secretary of Defense Perry, the Carter-Cédras agreement allowed the Haitian military to "continue to perform its policing missions until the military steps down or until October 15, whichever comes earlier..." [91].

However, with the rising expectations of Aristide's supporters, and the breakdown in authority of the military government and Haitian police (almost the same thing), Haitian-on-Haitian violence became even more common. Eventually, the violence led to an increased involvement of U.S. forces in stopping it, and the introduction of military police and international police monitors [93, 100].

The different approaches taken by the U.S. Army in Port-au-Prince and the U.S. Marines in Cap Haitien provide an example of the amount of flexibility a tactical commander can have, and how he can influence the political aspects of the operation. Early in the intervention, the Army in Port-au-Prince was involved in several incidents in which soldiers did not intervene in Haitian-on-Haitian violence. The Marines took a tougher stance, and the resultant firefight with

Haitian forces applied pressure on the Haitian military to take a less-aggressive approach toward civilians. These different interpretations of the rules of engagement (ROE) affected the overall perception of the operation by U.S. Government policy-makers and the U.S. public, and the success of the Marines' approach resulted in clarification of the ROE at the U.S. national level [1-3].

Other organizations

One of the important roles for the JTF commander in Haiti was working with other organizations and individuals to ensure that overall U.S. objectives were achieved. Relationships had to be forged with other U.S. agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and coalition forces. We have already mentioned the role played by the U.S. Justice Department and International Police Monitors in policing activities.

One example of where relationships were not established was the question of NGO involvement in providing aid to the Haitian people. Most NGOs saw Haiti more as a security problem than a humanitarian emergency. Some in the military, however, expected significant numbers of NGOs to participate early in the operation [101]. Thus, military forces were not generally authorized, nor were they funded or equipped, to provide significant humanitarian assistance during the early phases [3]. The lack of support from humanitarian NGOs resulted in no one fulfilling the expectations of the Haitian people for dramatic change once the U.S. forces arrived.

The evolution of operational-level command

We have briefly considered some of the specific constraints affecting the military operation in Haiti. Next, we'll look more generically at operational-level command and the opportunities and problems posed by the nature of the operation and the technologies available to meet the challenges. How could the commander best understand and operate within the constraints and evolving context of the operation, while feeding his on-scene perspective into U.S. policy and accomplishing his mission? Technologies, combined with a broader perspective, may provide the answer.

Increases in speed and bandwidth of communications are seen as important components in the RMA. The ability to communicate directly with precision standoff weapons may reduce the number of troops needed in the battle. Networked organizations created by networked communications may replace hierarchies in decision-making. Improvements in sensors may render the battlefield transparent and all the enemy's forces and actions known to the well-equipped commander [102-104].

Increasing bandwidth has also brought about a more subtle revolution. Besides increasing the commander's battlefield knowledge, high-bandwidth communications allow commanders to know more about the total environment—military and civilian—and to talk to many more people. Similarly, the media can use satellite communications to reach nearly everyone who has a television or radio, including decision-makers within the military's chain of command.

This emerging network of communications connections between everyone involved or affected by an operation may be transforming operational command from the command of military forces to a command that is neither civilian nor military, but a new operational force that combines both. And the central focus of this new command concept may be the use, through orchestration, collaboration, and persuasion, of all the forces and organizations involved in the operation. This means the military commander will be increasingly affected by, and have more opportunities to affect, the civilian components of an operation.

Of course, the need for commanders to understand and account for the broader context of their operations has always been present in military campaigns. In large-scale, traditional military operations, such as Desert Storm, military commanders work with other government agencies, such as the State and Justice Departments, to coordinate legal and diplomatic actions. Now, however, it is both the operational and tactical commanders who may be required to integrate context into their actions and planning. And in OOTW operations the number of non-military factors, organizations, and individuals that must be accounted for may be dramatically greater than in conventional operations.

However, the technology of networked, high-bandwidth communications may shrink the "distance" between the military context of an operation and these outside forces. This is true in both traditional military operations and operations more limited in scope or objectives, e.g., humanitarian-assistance or forcible-entry operations. This may be simultaneously brought on through the choices of military communicators and improvements in military communications, and impelled by changes in civilian communications technologies.

In many U.S.-led operations with substantial military involvement, the JTF commander may be one of the principal representatives of the operation to the media, and also to the American people and national decision-makers. In the future, this role may result in his being the focal point for communications; the representative of the overall, and not just military, operation; and the integrator for all the organizations in an operation. Whether this role goes to the JTF commander, or to some other organization, there may be a growing need for someone to oversee a wide range of diverse actors in an operation and bring them together in ways that satisfy the NCA's (or United Nations') overall objectives.

In thinking about the increasing overlap between military and civilian organizations in these operations, the JTF commander finds himself in an interesting position. Above him are the primary strategic players in the operation, especially the NCA. They are concerned with the broader domestic and international strategic and political implications of the operation.

Below him are his subordinate forces, which may be drawn from all the services and functional commands (such as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM)). He must combine these into a unified force.

In addition, many other actors, for example, private organizations, other countries, and other government agencies, may be involved. In many cases, these organizations have roles that limit or support the military portion of the operation. Or they may even be the primary reason for the operation, and the military forces may be supporting them.

The JTF commander may not be able to either command or persuade some of the organizations that affect the operation. For example, the government or people of the host nation may be beyond his control or influence. He may be able to find commonalities of interest with other organizations he does not command that help to advance common or overlapping goals. Among the many examples are the media, NGOs, and other governmental agencies.

Coordination also takes place within the chain of command, between staffs. For instance, in Uphold Democracy, the relationship that developed between the 18th Airborne Corps and USACOM planners was more like a collaboration. Work on the plans was passed back and forth between commands, depending on the phase of the operation.

In both military and other operations, the JTF commander uses relationships, persuasion, and collaboration with a range of military and other organizations to accomplish his goals. For Haiti, the JTF commander had to manage several political, social, and operational elements. Table 1 lists some of these.

Table 1. Political, social, and operational factors affecting the JTF commander in Haiti

Social	Political	Operational
History of U.S. involvement in Haiti	No-casualties policy	NCA/CINC information requirements
Expectations of Haitian people	No-nation-building policy	VIP (Carter delegation) protection
U.S. public perception of operation through the media (Haitian-on-Haitian violence)	Acknowledgment of legitimate government in Haiti	JSOC/SOCOM/Elite infantry (82nd Airborne/USMC) coordination
	Coalition troops	Possible NEO operations
	Police monitors	Other agency involvement (CIA/Justice Department/State Department)

Uphold Democracy began as a classic military operation to be followed by a security operation. In addition to the factors affecting command of the military operation, the operation itself had to evolve.

The military operation and the commanders had to adapt to the dramatic changes that occurred in the overall context of the operation.

We can characterize the changes that are occurring at the operational level of command as follows:

- Changing from *command* to *collaboration* outside the military chain of command
- Increasing the importance of *persuasion* in the commander's relationships with all organizations in the operation
- Increasing use of commanders as *negotiators*.

Command and collaboration

A well-defined and functioning chain of command is one capability that military forces bring to operations. Few other organizations can implement command chains as clearly or as effectively as the military. However, the increased capability of all parts of a force to communicate with any other element of the force may result in an evolving concept of the chain of command.

The more an operation includes elements outside military control, the more a commander and his staff must rely on others to provide expertise, assistance, and personnel.

The concept of a JTF commander and his staff recognizes this need for experience that is different from that of the core command element. The JTF staff consists of officers from all the services. They bring service expertise and, perhaps equally as important, contacts with their service bureaucracies.

The CINC provides at least two elements to the operational level that the JTF commander may not always be able to provide: a permanent command and staff, and a close relationship with the NCA. A JTF Command is organized as part of the crisis-action-planning (CAP) process. Planning done before a JTF commander is identified will most likely be done by the CINC staff [105]. When the JTF commander is identified before the JTF is activated, the JTF commander and the CINC can begin to work collaboratively on the plans.

The CINC also works with the NCA as part of the national command chain.

For Uphold Democracy, planning was done by the JTF and the CINC staffs during the different phases of the operation. USACOM planning for a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) started when the coup occurred in 1991. As the situation deteriorated, and the Cédras government went back on the Governors' Island agreement, planning for larger operations began in 1993 [1].

As the time to begin the operation approached, planning was turned over to the 18th Airborne Corps. Eventually, 18th Airborne Corps, working with USACOM planners, was responsible for turning the scheduled invasion from a forcible-entry into a permissive-entry operation. In the process of changing the plans, and then changing them again, four iterations of the plans were worked out.

The planning process was largely a collaboration between USACOM and 18th Airborne Corps (the JTF). Staff members could communicate on a wide range of circuits. On board USS *Mount Whitney*, data, voice (telephone run through Norfolk), and video teleconferencing (VTC) allowed the CINC and JTF commander, as well as all levels of both staffs, to work together during planning.

In both the planned and the executed versions of Uphold Democracy, the intentions of the CINC and NCA were critical to operational success. In addition, the JTF commander had to work with U.S. State Department personnel (including the ambassador) ashore in country. He also had to work with ICITAP and the IPMs once he was ashore and policing began.¹³ Networked communications, whether voice, video, or data, enabled the commander to draw these outside organizations into the planning process.

13. USACOM planning, particularly for the permissive entry scenario, included substantial interagency participation. This is not to imply that the planning for Haiti included all who should have been included. For the forcible entry plan, because of classification, many commands and command elements were kept "in the dark" about the plans until the last minute (or even later). For example, see [101].

New communications capabilities, such as telephone, video, and e-mail/file sharing, now allow commanders and their staffs to include personal information in communications. More bandwidth means that additional information can be included over and above the minimum that is needed. Faster turnaround times also mean that questions can be asked, allowing the sender to clarify the content.

The higher-bandwidth communications let staffs focus less on the communications media and more on the task. No longer are communications forced to assume a particular structure because of the nature of the transmission. With radio and teletype message communications, the format and conventions (procedures) of the communications media dictated a rigid style and limited the ability to include informal (for example, gestures and other nonverbal communications) content in the message.

Persuasion

During an operation, the operational-level military commander's primary responsibility is to make decisions and to implement them. This requires that he not only command his own forces, but he must persuade those he does not command. Table 2 lists a few of the organizations with whom the operational commander (General Shelton) and his staff had to interact during the planning and execution of Uphold Democracy.

Table 2. Organizations involved in the early phases of Uphold Democracy

U.S. Government	Non-U.S. Government	Haitian
NCA (information requests)	United Nations	Military government of Haiti
National Security Agency	International police monitors	Aristide government
State Department	Media	Haitian parliament
Central Intelligence Agency	Coalition forces	
Special Forces		
Component commanders		
ICITAP ^a		

a. International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program

One of the operational commander's tasks is to work with all the actors involved in an operation to accomplish his objectives. He must understand the other organizations' views of the operation, integrate them with his plan and mission, and work with the other organizations to accomplish the overall goals for the operation. How does he accomplish this when, as shown in table 2, he commands only a small fraction of the total number of actors? He does it by using the following:

- *Presence.* By being on scene, the commander can meet face to face with the principal actors. Members of his staff can also meet with their counterparts. This can increase the commander's understanding of the other organizations' interests and views, as well as allow him and his staff to work with them to integrate his objectives with theirs.
- *Relationships.* Through personal contact and VTC, phone, and data communications, a commander can develop working relationships with others involved in the operation, even though he is not present.

In Uphold Democracy, General Shelton and his personal staff were in one of the first helicopters ashore after the airport in Port-au-Prince was secured. He went ashore so that he could immediately contact the still-in-place Cédras government. But later he returned to USS *Mount Whitney* to report over in-place VTC and secure-voice circuits.

Negotiation and intimidation

When close relationships do not exist, or cannot be forged between the military and other organizations, or when the organizations have competing objectives, persuasion may not work. Then the commander must rely on intimidation, negotiation, or force. In the first few days of Uphold Democracy, the commander could persuade other U.S. or military organizations, and even the media. But he, along with the ambassador and others, had to negotiate with the still ruling military government of Haiti. Part of the process of negotiation, particularly in the north (Cap Haitien), was the intimidating presence of U.S. forces.

Negotiation is not new to military commanders. Washington at Yorktown, Grant at Appomattox, and Schwarzkopf in Saudi Arabia all had some latitude in agreements with defeated opponents. However, the difference between traditional war termination and what occurs in operations such as Uphold Democracy is that negotiations can become as follows:

- *Continuous.* The Carter-Cédras agreement was not the end of a conflict, it was the beginning of a “process” of one government leaving and another government coming in. It was an extremely volatile situation, with violence occurring daily in the streets. This required the commanders, from the JTF commander to the individual component commanders, to negotiate with the various power centers in Haitian society to maintain order and move the country toward democracy. Even after Aristide’s return, the commanders had to work with the new government to ensure that Haiti was safe and secure.
- *Part of the mission.* One of the objectives of the commander was ensuring the safe restoration of democracy in Haiti. What was not done by direct force had to be done through intimidation. The Marines in Cap Haitien used a combination of warning, intimidation, and force against the Haitian police and military [54, 55, 106]. The Army in Port-au-Prince and the Special Forces in the countryside favored negotiation over direct violence. But even they were not beyond direct confrontation.
- *Pervasive.* In Haiti everyone had to negotiate, not merely the commanders, but also the Special Forces in small towns and the Marines in Cap Haitien [54, 93]. The process of persuading an uncooperative opponent to do what you want him to do is required throughout the ranks, from the commander to the individual soldier or Marine.

The change

Recent humanitarian and small-scale military operations suggest that the way military forces operate is changing. In this section, we sum up the developments in command and assault that we discussed in previous sections.

Command

Technology increasingly allows nonmilitary factors to encroach on the military components of an operation. The military's ability to make decisions, command, and communicate means that it may play a prominent role in operations that are neither traditional warfare operations, nor wholly civilian humanitarian operations. The military may be in charge or it may be supporting other organizations. Either way, the nonmilitary parts of the operation may dominate the commander's daily decisions. And, in the future, nonmilitary factors may become increasingly influential in traditional conflict operations.

The commander's role at the operational level may be changing from one of purely military decision-making to one or more of a variety of other roles, depending on the circumstances. These roles include:

- *Collaborator.* Command staffs are beginning to be deployed with a revolutionary suite of communications equipment: VTC, phones, wide- and local-area networks, and distributed computing. The biggest impact these changes have on the command staffs is in the relationships they can now develop with others involved in the operation. The relationship between the JTF commander and the CINC is no longer mediated through formalized radio or message traffic. They can pick up the phone and talk to each other. As closer relationships develop between commanders and the other military and civilian components in an operation, the conventional hierarchies may be undermined. Command and control, particularly for planning,

begins to take on more aspects of a collaboration. Staffs begin to divide functionally instead of hierarchically to work on common problems.

- *Actor.* The commander is now such an integral part of the operation that his personal actions have a direct impact on whether the operation is perceived as successful. He can represent the operation to the media and to the opposition, even if he is not in charge of the overall operation. He also has the opportunity to use his understanding of, and relationships with, all the other actors in the operation to shape the nature of what is being done.
- *Integrator.* The commander is responsible for, and must make decisions concerning, many factors that are not traditionally associated with military operations. This may eventually grow to include organizations inside the military command organization that do not currently operate under the JTF commander. Similarly, the JTF commander may work alongside other command organizations, such as the United Nations or Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. These organizations may operate in collaboration or association with the JTF, but not under the direct command of the JTF commander.
- *Creator.* Who shapes the operation? The duties of the CINC and the JTF commander are now divided. The CINC plans and organizes the operation, and the JTF commander shapes it in execution. If the operation is purely a military operation, the operational-level commander has a series of relatively difficult, but straightforward, decisions to make. If the operation includes civilian factors, the variety of decisions not only increase, but the commander's options for how to proceed in the operation also increase enormously.

To deal with these options, the commander should understand the entire context of the operation. He may then use this understanding to develop creative solutions to operational problems. Creative solutions may require decisions that modify orders, eliminate the distinction between military and civilian, or require the commander to take on more bureaucratic risk than his position normally allows.

Creative solutions can vary widely, depending on circumstances. A commander could incorporate nongovernmental organizations directly or "virtually" (through internet technologies [88]) into the military command organization. Or, through benign neglect or liberal interpretation of orders such as "force protection," he may engage in courses of action that, though necessary for the overall mission, do not follow the spirit of his guidance from higher authority.

Assault

Haiti is an example of how overwhelming force, and the ability to target the force through precision intelligence and high-bandwidth communications, can provide a range of options to national commanders. Depending on the nature of the targets, conventional infrastructure, dispersed irregular ground forces, or some combination, the CINC can offer a spectrum of options to the NCA, from operations that target individuals and small units using Special Forces and airmobile operations to large-scale air operations that destroy infrastructure.

Combining speed and precision with highly capable ground forces will allow operations to increasingly resemble *coups* instead of linear warfare. The literature on the RMA and airpower operations has concentrated on destroying developed infrastructure and large units. If, as is often the case with smaller operations, only a few individuals are the real opposition, then intimidation, capture, or killing of only those individuals may be far more effective than attacks on infrastructure.

What may be occurring is an extension of the factors that give airpower the advantages of speed, precision, and lethality to airborne, seaborne, and airmobile ground and Special Forces. This may be a decided advantage when targets and political circumstances cannot be engaged directly by airpower.

Accounting for the change

In previous sections, we have said that it is increasingly important for commanders to incorporate many nonmilitary factors and relationships into their thinking and planning. But we are aware that this is easier said than done. There are no clear prescriptions for accomplishing this, but it may be easier if the commander realizes that planning and directing an operation such as Uphold Democracy is not very different from what he is used to. The difference is in the scope.

In a military, tactical-level operation, the commander must maneuver forces and direct fire effectively at targets. The process by which he does this has been described as the observe, orient, decide, and act cycle, or OODA loop. In operations such as Uphold Democracy, the process is fundamentally the same, except the goals and means with which the commander is concerned are much broader. He must take advantage of a broader range of intelligence sources and must think of his "forces" as including nonmilitary organizations. This is in some ways just an extension of the continuing trend toward joint military operations that is being made possible by improved technology—particularly communication and computing technology. Thus, the next step after incorporating other service intelligence and forces into the operation is to include political, economic, and humanitarian factors and organizations.

A key ingredient that will determine the success or failure of an operation will be the attitude of the commander and his staff—their understanding of the need for forging relationships with nonmilitary organizations in order to achieve the following:

- Get the intelligence (information) needed to plan and react quickly
- Obtain the cooperation of the many organizations that can influence the outcome of the operation.

To be successful, this requires the commander to reach beyond the purely military point of view. He must understand the perspectives of the other organizations and know their objectives. In addition, he must have the skills to extend his influence beyond the chain of command, to persuade organizations and individuals with whom he has no official relationship or standing.

Being able to collect, understand, and use information to create new ways of operating and adapting can be a powerful force in dealing with both military and nonmilitary aspects of the operation. An environment where plans, forces, and operational approaches are constantly changing makes it harder for an enemy to operate—not only at the tactical level of combat between forces, but also at the operational and strategic levels. The commander can accomplish this process of constant change in several ways:

- Rapidly reconfiguring his operational plans and overall approach toward the operation—such as changing from one campaign plan to another.
- Adjusting the relationships between the organizations involved to fit the operational requirements. This was done in Haiti before the operation, when the command relationships between the forcible-entry, permissive-entry, and maritime-intercept-operations (MIO) JTF commanders were changed.
- Adjusting his operational plans to changes in the environment. As a commander's ideas are tested against what his troops are encountering operationally and sent back up the chain of command, either through his own communications systems or the media, the commander can adapt his operational objectives. What he can change in response to what is going on operationally will vary with the scenario. During combat, a commander might choose to reposition his forces or change resource allocations in response to reports from subordinate units. In operations where violence is limited (e.g., complex humanitarian operations), a commander might choose to bring in a new organization, such as the military police, to change the entire dynamic and focus of the operation.

By being able to assess and react rapidly to changes in the fundamental nature of the operation (as opposed to detecting and reacting to specific tactical threats), the commander can use his better *understanding* of the operational environment to outmaneuver and outwit his opponents.

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